Purdue University

Purdue e-Pubs
ECE Technical Reports

Electrical and Computer Engineering

5-8-2007

Distributed Diagnosis of Failures in a Three Tier ECommerce System
Fahad Arshad
Purdue University, faarshad@purdue.edu

Gunjan Khanna
Purdue University, jkhanna@purdue.edu

Ignacio Laguna
Purdue University, ilaguna@purdue.edu

Saurabh Bagchi
Purdue University, sbagchi@purdue.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://docs.lib.purdue.edu/ecetr
Arshad, Fahad; Khanna, Gunjan; Laguna, Ignacio; and Bagchi, Saurabh, "Distributed Diagnosis of Failures in a Three Tier ECommerce System" (2007). ECE Technical Reports. Paper 354.
http://docs.lib.purdue.edu/ecetr/354

This document has been made available through Purdue e-Pubs, a service of the Purdue University Libraries. Please contact epubs@purdue.edu for
additional information.

Distributed Diagnosis of Failures in a Three Tier
E-Commerce System
Gunjan Khanna, Ignacio Laguna, Fahad Arshad, Saurabh Bagchi
Dependable Computing Systems Lab
School of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Purdue University
Email: {gkhanna, ilaguna, faarshad, sbagchi}@purdue.edu

Abstract. For dependability outages in distributed internet infrastructures, it is often not enough to detect a
failure, but it is also required to diagnose it, i.e., to identify its source. Complex applications deployed in
multi-tier environments, such as the classic three tier e-commerce system, make diagnosis challenging
because of fast error propagation, black-box applications, constraints on the diagnosis delay, the amount of
states that can be maintained, and imperfect diagnostic tests. Here, we propose a probabilistic diagnosis model
for arbitrary failures in components of a distributed application. The monitoring system (the Monitor)
passively observes the message exchanges between the components and at runtime, performs a probabilistic
diagnosis of the component that was the root cause of a detected failure. The diagnosis model takes into
account the possibility of a service failure, link failure, test imperfection, and lack of perfect observability at
the monitoring station. We demonstrate the approach by applying it to a J2EE-based e-commerce application
called Pet Store exercising a workload of browse-and-buy user transactions. We compare our approach with
Pinpoint by quantifying the latency and accuracy of the two systems. The Monitor system outperforms
Pinpoint by achieving comparably accurate diagnosis with higher precision in shorter time.
Keywords. Distributed system diagnosis, runtime monitoring, probabilistic diagnosis, fault injection based
evaluation, J2EE e-commerce system.

I. Introduction
The connected society of today has come to rely heavily on distributed computer infrastructure, be
it an ATM network, or the distributed multi-tier applications behind e-commerce sites. The
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consequences of downtime of distributed systems may be catastrophic. They range from customer
dissatisfaction to financial losses to loss of human lives [40], [41]. There is an increased reliance on
Internet services supported by multi-tier applications where the typical three tiers are the web,
middleware and database tier. In distributed systems, especially multi-tier applications, the fault in a
component may manifest itself as an error, and then propagate to multiple services through the
normal communication between the services. The error may remain undetected for an arbitrary
length of time causing long error propagation chains. The error can propagate from one component
to another and finally manifest itself as a failure. The failure might be detected at a component
distant from the originally faulty component. The availability of a system can be quantified as
MTTF/(MTTF+MTTR) (MTTF: Mean time to failure, MTTR: Mean time to recovery). There is
enormous effort in the fault tolerance community to increase the reliability of components in a
distributed system, thus increasing MTTF. There is also a growing number of efforts aimed at
reducing MTTR [34]. An important requirement for this is to know which components to recover.
This requires tracing back through the chain of errors to determine the component that originated
the failure. This serves as the goal for our diagnosis protocol.
For the application and diagnosis model, consider that the application is comprised of multiple
services communicating through standard protocols and externally observable messages. Example
of such application services are web services and authentication services. The services themselves
are comprised of multiple components, e.g. Enterprise Java Beans (EJBs) or servlets, and the
interactions between these components are also externally visible. Separate from the application
system, we have a monitoring system (the Monitor) that can observe the external interactions of the
components but not their internal states. The Monitor initiates diagnosis when a failure is detected
through an existing detection system. In this paper we use the existing detection system from our
previous work [1].
In practical deployments, the Monitor may not observe the interaction between components of the
application perfectly because of congestion or their relative network placement. This is particularly
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likely because the application as well as the Monitor is distributed with components spread out
among possibly distant hosts. Next, any Monitor will have limited resources and may drop some
message interactions from consideration due to exhaustion of its resources (e.g., buffers) during
periods of peak load. Third, any diagnostic tests used by the Monitor might not be perfect. Finally,
several parameters of the environment are not known deterministically and have to be estimated at
runtime. These include the ability of a component to stop the cascade of error propagation (error
masking ability) and the unreliability of links between the application components and the Monitor.
All these factors necessitate the design of a probabilistic diagnosis protocol, in which the root cause
of the failure cannot be deterministically identified.
Our solution implemented in the Monitor rests on three basic techniques. First, the messages
between the components are used to build a causal dependency structure between the components.
Second, when a failure is detected, the causal structure is traversed (till a well-defined bound) and
each component is tested using diagnostic tests. These diagnostic tests are not executed on the
components directly but on the component state that had been deduced and stored at the Monitor.
We decide against direct tests on the components because the state of the component may have
changed since the time it propagated the error and the probing introduces additional stress on the
component at a time when failures are already occurring in the system. Third, runtime observations
are used to continually estimate the parameters that bear on the possibility of error propagation,
such as unreliability of links and error masking capabilities. In our approach, the end goal of the
probabilistic diagnosis process is to produce a vector of values called the Path Probability of Error
Propagation (PPEP). For the diagnosis executed due to a failure detected at component n, PPEP of
a component i is the conditional probability that component i is the faulty component that originated
the cascaded chain of errors culminating in n.
The basic structuring of an observer and an observed system is not new [1], [2], [3]. The problem
of diagnosis of failures in networked environments comprised of black-box entities has also been
studied by numerous researchers [28], [29], [35]. Some of these efforts however are aimed at easing
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the task of distributed debugging rather than accurate diagnosis of the faulty entity, some are offline
approaches, some require accurate prior dependency information between the entities, and yet
others need help from the application system through event generation. Our work aims to provide
diagnosis of the faulty entities at runtime in a non-intrusive manner to the application.
We apply the diagnosis protocol to a three tier e-commerce system consisting of the Pet Store
application deployed on the JBoss application server with the Tomcat web server as the front end
and the MySQL database server at the backend. The application supports multiple kinds of browseand-buy transactions that involve interactions between many components, where components are
defined as servlets and EJBs. Through a modification to the JBoss containers, messages between the
components are trapped and forwarded to the Monitor. We compare our approach to Pinpoint [29]
in terms of accuracy and precision of diagnosis. Pinpoint uses statistical clustering of components
with failed transactions to identify the faulty components. We inject errors in the application, where
the errors may be due to a single component or interactions between multiple components. Our
approach outperforms Pinpoint with the accuracy of the diagnosis improving from 20% to 100%
over the Pinpoint algorithm for comparable precision values.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II, presents the system model. Section III
presents the probabilistic diagnosis approach. Section IV presents the implementation and
experimental test bed. Section V presents the experimental results. Section VI reviews related work
and Section VII concludes the paper.

II. System Model and Background
There are two distinct systems—the Monitor and the application system. The Monitor obtains the
protocol messages either through modification to the application’s middleware layer to forward the
messages or by a passive snooping mechanism by the Monitor. In either scenario the internal state
of the components is not visible to the Monitor and they are treated as black-box for the diagnostic
process. The diagnostic process is triggered when a failure is detected.
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A.

Assumptions

We assume that components can fail arbitrarily, as long as the failures are observable in the
message interaction between components. These failures could be caused by incorrect deployment,
software bug, security vulnerability or performance problems to name a few. We follow the
classical definition of faults being underlying defects that are triggered to become errors and some
errors causing end-user visible failures. Errors can propagate from one component to another
through the message exchanges between them.

Monitor
Rulebase
Network service component
Interaction among service components
Monitoring interaction among service components

Figure 1. A monitoring system, (the Monitor) verifying the interactions between the service
components.

The communication between the components can be asynchronous but the jitter on any given link
between component and the Monitor is bounded. We assume that the Monitor maintains a logical
clock for each observed component and it is incremented for each event – a send or receive message.
The assumption required by the diagnosis protocol is that for an S(ender)-R(eceiver)
communication, the variation in the latency on the S-M(onitor) channel as well as the variation in
the sum of the latency in the S-R and R-M channels is less than a constant ∆t, called the phase. If
messages M1 and M2, corresponding to two send events at S, are received at the Monitor at (logical)
times t1 and t2, it is guaranteed that the send event M1 happened before M2 if t2 ≥ t1+∆t. The
communication channel is considered to be unreliable where message duplication, loss or
conversion to another correct protocol message may happen.
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B.

Dependency Information

The Monitor performing diagnosis maintains a causal graph during the times that it is verifying the
operation of the application protocol. Let us denote the causal graph at Monitor m by CGm which is
a graph (V, E) where (i) The set V contains all the components verified by m; (ii) An edge or link e
contained in E, between vertices v1 and v2 (which represent components) indicates interaction
between v1 and v2 and contains state information about all observed message exchanges between v1
and v2 including the logical clock (LC) at each end. The state information includes a type of
interaction and any arguments associated with that interaction. The links in the CG are also timestamped with the local (physical) time at the Monitor where the link is created. An example of a CG
created at the Monitor is given in Figure 2 for the sequence of message exchange events shown with
components A, B, C, and D. The number denotes the sequence of the messages. For example, for
message ‘6’, the logical clock time at the sender is B.LC4. Since message ‘2’ is assigned a logical
time value of B.LC2, it causally precedes message ‘6’. The LC time stamps helps obtain a partial
order over the messages and hence causality. The order of the messages is the order seen by the
Monitor which may be different from the order in the application because the communication links
are asynchronous.
For a link to be completed in the CG, a matching is required between the sending and the
receiving component’s messages. The link A→B will be matched once both the message sent by A
and the corresponding message received by B are seen at the Monitor. The Monitor initially stores
the messages in a Temporary Links table and moves the matched links to the CG when some trigger
is met. As many links as can be matched are transferred to the CG while those that are not matched,
but are within the phase from the latest message, are kept in the temporary links. Remaining links in
the temporary links table are moved to the CG as unmatched links.
It is imperative to avoid the CG growing in an unbounded manner since this would lead to long
delays in traversing the CG during diagnosis leading to high latency in diagnosis. However,
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complete purging of the information in the CG can cause inaccuracies during the diagnosis process.
We use aggregation of the state information in the CG at specified time points and storing it in an
Aggregate Graph (AG). The Aggregate Graph contains aggregate information about the protocol
behavior averaged over the past. The AG is similar to CG in the structure i.e. a node represents a
component and a link represents a communication channel. Unlike the CG there is a single directed
link between A and B for all the messages which are sent from A to B. The AG contains some node
level information (such as, the node reliability) and some link level information (such as, the
reliability of the link in the application system).

C.

Diagnosis Tree

When a failure occurs, a Diagnosis Tree (DT) is constructed using the state information stored in
CG. The DT formed for failure F at node D is denoted as DTFD. The tree is rooted at node D and the
nodes which have directly sent messages to node D are present at depth 1. Recursively, depth i
consists of all the components which have sent messages to nodes at depth (i-1). Since the CG is
finite size, the tree is terminated when no causally preceding message is available in the CG after
some depth k. The same component might appear several times in the tree at various depths because
it might have exchanged messages with various components at different points during the
application run. Specifically, a component is represented as many number of times as the number
of different states it has been in, while exchanging messages.

D.

Diagnostic Tests

We assume the existence of diagnostic tests which operate on a component and are specific to that
component and its state. We impose that the tests should only operate on the information already
stored at the Monitor. These tests could be probabilistic in nature, implying that they may not be
perfect. The specifics of these tests do not affect our probabilistic model. However, for our
implementation, we employ a kind of tests called causal tests. A causal test has the following
format:
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<Type> <State1> <Event1> <Count1> <State2> <Event2> <Count2>
where, Type could be one of {incoming, outgoing, hybrid} depending on the kind of messages
being tested. The (State1, Event1, Count1) forms the precondition to be matched, while (State2,
Event2, Count2) forms the post-condition that should be satisfied for the node to be deemed correct.
The examination of Event 2 is done in an interval of time ∆t (a phase) from Event 1. The tuple (S, E,
C) refers to the fact that the event E should have been detected in the state S at least count C
number of times.
Message ID
1
8
2
6
7
3
4
5

Sender.LogicalClock,
Receiver.LogicalClock
A.LC1, B.LC1
A.LC4, D.LC3
B.LC2, C.LC1
B.LC4, A.LC3
B.LC5, D.LC2
C.LC2, B.LC3
C.LC3, A.LC2
C.LC4, D.LC1

Figure 2.
A sample causal graph. A, B, C and D exchange messages
1-8 among each other. The message ID indicates the
causal order, i.e., message 1 precedes the rest of messages

Figure 3.
Sample DT for the CG in Fig. 2.

The correctness rules can be created by examining the state transition diagram (STD) of the
component and verifying the transitions or by observing some traces of the correct protocol
operation. Additionally, rules corresponding to QoS requirements (such as, the number of accesses
to the SignOnEJB in Pet Store must be restricted to 20 within a 1 sec time window) can be framed
by the system administrators. Finally, rules for verifying security properties in the system (such as,
the number of logins to Pet Store bounded by a threshold) can be set by security administrators.
Rules therefore can be framed through a mix of automated and manual means. This is similar to the
situation in all rule based systems, such as intrusion detection systems [4], [5].

III. Probabilistic Diagnosis
The operation of the diagnosis protocol has two logical phases: (1) The diagnostic process that
results in a set of nodes being diagnosed as the root cause of failure; (2) Information from the
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diagnostic process being used to update the parameters used later diagnoses. The overall process is
depicted in Figure 4. Let us first look at the diagnostic process. The goal of the diagnostic process is
to calculate the probability of each node in the distributed system being faulty.

A.

Path Probability of Error Propagation

The DT forms the basic structure on which the algorithm operates. The path P from any node ni to
the root of the DT constitutes a possible path for error propagation, i.e. a fault present in ni could
have caused the root node to fail during operation. The probability of a path being the chain of error
propagation is termed as the Path Probability of Error Propagation (PPEP).
A sample DT created from the sample CG in Figure 2 is shown in Figure 3. Here the failure was
manifested at node D. The numbers at the links correspond to the message IDs. The root of the tree
is the failure node, i.e., D. Depth 1 consists of nodes C and B which have sent messages to D
causally before the failure was detected. Here node B is repeated twice because the states of B in
which B→C and B→D communication take place are different.
Definition: PPEP(N, D) is defined as the probability of node N being faulty and causing this error
to propagate on the path from N to D, leading to a failure at D. PPEP depends on the following
parameters:
(1) Node reliability – The node reliability (nr) is a quantitative measure of the component
corresponding to the node being correct. The PPEP for a given node is proportional to (1- nr). This
node reliability is obtained by running the diagnostic tests on the state of the entity. A set of
predetermined tests are performed, each of which yields a ‘0’ (test flags an error) or a ‘1’ (success).
If the entire set of tests is denoted by R and a subset of tests which yield ‘1’ be denoted by R′, we
define coverage c(n) = |R′ |/|R|, assuming all tests have equal weights. For the first time the
diagnosis is triggered, the node reliability is equal to c(n). During the entire execution of the
application, multiple failures cause multiple diagnosis procedures to execute. Each time the
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diagnosis is performed, node reliabilities (in AG) corresponding to all of the nodes in the DT are
updated. We will explain in Section B how to update the node reliabilities.

Figure 4. Schematic with the overall process flow of the diagnostic process

(2) Link Reliability – In simple terms the link realibility between two nodes ni and nj denoted
as lr (i , j ) and measures the number of received packets by the receiver over the number of packets
actually sent. The PPEP for a given node is proportional to the link reliability, because high link
reliability increases the probability of the path being used for propagating the error. The link
reliability is maintained for each edge in the AG. Note that since the Monitor is only observing the
system, the errors within the Monitor in observing the messages also may erroneously affect the
link reliability. These errors cannot be distinguished in our framework. Monitor deduces the link
reliability through observing the fraction of successful message transmissions over a particular link.
(3) Error masking capability (EMC) – The error masking capability (em) quantifies the ability of
a node to mask an error and not propagate it to the subsequent link on the path in the DT toward the
root. The EMC of an entity depends on the type of error, e.g., syntactical or semantic errors.
Additionally, a node may have different error masking capabilities depending on the type of
message being processed and forwarded, e.g., if there is an off-by-one bug in the counter check on
the number of simultaneous JDBC connections, it will mask the errors when the number of JDBC
connections is one more than the maximum threshold. The EMC of node C in Figure 3 is denoted
by em(C) and is a function of message type and error type. The PPEP for a given node is inversely
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proportional to the EMC values of nodes in the path since the intermediate nodes are less likely to
have propagated the error to the root node.

With the DT in Figure 3, PPEP(C, D) = (1-nr(C)) · lr(C,D), PPEP(B, D) = (1-nr(B)) · lr(B,C)
· (1- em(C)) · lr(C,D). For a general path P consisting of nodes n1, n2…nk with link lr(i, j) between
nodes ni and nj, the PPEP(n1, nk) for a failure detected at node nk (root node in the corresponding
DT) is given by
PPEP(n1, nk) = (1-nr(n1))·lr(1,2)·(1- em(n2))·lr(2,3)… (1-nr(ni))·lr(i,i+1)·(1- em(ni+1))·lr(i+1,i+2)… (1- em(nk-1))·lr(k-1,k).

Consider a far simpler alternative that may at first glance seem sufficient for the problem of
diagnosis. The system simply looks at all messages in the system at runtime and checks them using
the causal tests. The Monitor could detect the error very quickly after the earliest message that
failed a test. However, this scheme would be incorrect. First, the system cannot check the messages
as they come in. The rules are specified in terms of logical time and not absolute time (a corollary
of the asynchronous nature of the system). Additionally, all rules cannot be matched at runtime
because that would impose unnecessary overhead and would not be useful in most executions
(when there is no failure). The first component that failed a test does not necessarily implicate the
component that sent it, other factors are to be considered, such as, how reliable were the links
between that component and the component at which the failure was ultimately detected. This is
because the distance from the root is not a matter simply of the number of links on the DT. Also, the
tests are not perfect and cannot therefore be trusted to indict a component by itself.
For an autonomous system, the parameters used in the diagnosis process should be automatically
updated during the lifetime of the system as more failures and message interactions are observed
and this forms the topic of our discussion next.

B.

Updating Node reliability

The node reliabilities are updated based on the results of the diagnostic tests. Let the set of tests that
can be applied to the node i (based on the event and the state) be Ti. This set is partitioned into two
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sub-sets A′ and A respectively depending upon the test outcome, i.e., the test returned a value of ‘1’
or ‘0’. If the weight of test j in Ti, is is wi,j then the current coverage of node i is given by

c(i ) = ∑ wi , j / ∑ wi , j .
j∈A '

j∈Ti

The weight of a test is proportional to (1) the frequency of invocations (w(f)) where the test gave
the correct result; and (2) whether the test examines state for a period of time greater than the length
of transients in the system (w(r)). The overall weight is calculated as
wi , j = wi(, fj ) .wi(,rj)

.
The first factor is quite self-explanatory—higher the number of times the test has been seen to
operate correctly, the higher is the confidence placed on it. The second factor argues that violation
of a tested property for less than the transient period in the system is not indicative of a fault. The
value c(i) is the current coverage of the node and does not consider the past history of node present
in AG. The final node reliability is updated using exponential weighting as nr(A) = (1- ρ)c(i) +
ρnr(A). The value nr(A) is maintained in the AG. The weight can be adjusted depending upon the
particular scenario.

C.

Updating Link Reliability

Link reliability of the edge from A to B is calculated as lr(A,B) = nm/ nt + nm, where nm is the number
of matched edges for A-to-B communication and nt is the number of unmatched edges from A to B.
This formulation is based on the observation that if the sender notifies the Monitor of a sent
message and the receiver does not report the corresponding packet, this is indication of a lossy link.
Overall lr(A,B) is updated with the link reliability for the current round (lr(c)) using exponential
weighting as lr(A,B) = (1- ρ)lr(c) + ρlr(A,B). Notice that in the PPEP calculation, the link reliabilities
of adjoining links are multiplied though the events are actually not independent. Consider a linear
chain of communication from A to B and B to C. The probability of a successful communication
from A to C is P(A→B is successful)·P(B→C is successful | A→B is successful). In the link
reliability calculation, the dependence is implicitly taken into account since the matched and
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unmatched link count on the B→C link is affected by the events on the A→B link and the
measurement of the matched and unmatched links is used in the link reliability computation.

D.

Updating Error Masking Capability

Consider in the DT of Figure 3, nodes C and A at the same depth 2, are both faulty but PPEP(C) is
the highest and PPEP(A) is low. This will cause node C to be diagnosed as faulty. In this case node
B is taken to have masked the error originating from node A and not propagated it if the following
three conditions are satisfied: (i) Running diagnostic tests on B yields a high coverage; (ii) Running
diagnostic tests on A yields a low coverage; and (iii) Link reliabilities lr(A,B) and lr(B,D) are high
(to ensure that the error must have propagated).
The incremental change ∆(EMC) is thus given by
∆(EMC) = EMCprev

(1 − c( A)) • l r(A , B) • l r(B , D)
(1 − c ( B ))

EMCnew = EMCold+∆(EMC)
We decrease the EMC for every intermediate node residing on a path which is finally diagnosed to
have caused the error propagation.

E.

Distributed PPEP

The nodes in the Diagnosis Tree may be present in several networks and even organizational
boundaries and be verified by different Monitors each of which constructs a part of the AG and the
CG obtained from its local information. During diagnosis it is quite likely that the DT contains
nodes which are verified by some other Local Monitors. We leverage the fact that due to the
multiplicative form of the PPEP computation, the PPEP value can be computed incrementally by
each Monitor for the part of the DT under its verification domain. Each Local Monitor runs the
diagnosis algorithm to obtain the PPEP values for the nodes under its verification domain. This
information is aggregated at a higher level Monitor (such as an Intermediate Monitor) to determine
the faulty entity.
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IV. Experimental Testbed
A.

Application

We use for our evaluation PetStore (version 1.4), a sample J2EE application developed under the
Java BluePrints program at Sun Microsystems [37]. It runs on top of the JBoss application server
[38] with MySQL database [39] as the back-end providing an example of a 3-tier environment.
Figure 5 depicts the application topology for the experiments. The PetStore application is driven by
a web client emulator which generates client transactions based on sample traces. The web client
emulator is written in Perl using lynx as the web browser. For the mix of client transactions, we
mimic the TPC-WIPSo [36] distribution with equal percentage of browse and buy interactions. The
servlets and the EJBs are considered as components in our experiments and these serve as the
granularity level at which diagnosis is done. This design choice is based partly on the fact that in
JBoss a faulty servlet or an EJB can be switched out at runtime for a correct one. We identify a total
of 56 components in the application.
We consider a web interaction to be a complete cycle of communication between the client
emulator and the application, as it is defined by the TPC Benchmark WIPSo specification [36]. This
cycle starts when the client emulator initiates a web request and it is completed when the last byte
of data from the response page has been received by the client emulator. Examples of web
interactions could be entering the Welcome page or executing a Search. A transaction is a sequence
of web interactions. An example of a transaction by a user who is searching and viewing
information about a particular product is: Welcome page  Search  View Item details. For our
experiments we created a total of 55 different transactions. A round is a permutation of these 55
transactions modeling different user activities that occur on the web store. Within a round,
transactions are executed one at a time. Two transactions are considered to be non-unique if they
use exactly the same components, neglecting the order in which the components are used. Thus, a
transaction that comprises: Welcome, Search, Search is not unique with respect to another that
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comprises: Welcome, Search. There are 41 unique transactions in the set of 55 transactions that we
use. Although 55 is not an exhaustive set of possible transactions in the application, the chosen set
exercised a wide variety of web-interactions and between them, touched all the components of
PetStore. We note that the results presented here depend on the exact set of transactions used to
exercise the system.
We instrumented the JBoss application server to snoop over the message communication between
PetStore components. JBoss has a layered architecture and each communication traverses multiple
interceptors. We modify the SecurityInterceptor to forward messages to the Monitor for updating
the causal graph. Thus, the PetStore application is left unchanged.

B.

Monitor configuration

The diagnosis algorithm in the Monitor is implemented in Java. The Monitor is provided an input of
state transition diagrams for the verified components and causal tests used during calculation of
PPEP values. The size of the causal graph is bounded at 100 links.
Figure 6 shows an example STD for CreditCardEJB used by the Monitor in our experiments. A
start state S0 signifies a no request state. If a request for processing is received from another
component, the state of the EJB moves from S0 accordingly. With the STD, we have some simple
causal tests which can be derived from the STD itself. As explained in section II.D, causal tests are
dependent on the state and event of the component. For example, if the EJB is requested for
getData() then in state S1 there must be a return from getData() to ensure correct operation of the
EJB. This is verified using the first rule in Figure 6. The exhaustive list of STDs and rules used for
the experiments here is provided in [42].
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Figure 5. Logical Topology of the Client and Server for the Experiments
S4
Return
getCardType()

getData()

getExpiryData()

S3

getCardType()

S0
Return
getExpiryData()

S2
Return getData()

getExpiryMonth()

Return
getExpiryMonth()

S1

S0 getData 1 S2 return getData1 1
S0 getExpiryMonth 1 S1 return getExpiryMonth1 1
S0 getExpiryData 1 S3 return getExpiryData 1 1
S0 cardType 1 S4 return cardType1 1

Figure 6. An example STD for CreditCardEJB along with some illustration of Causal Tests.

C.

Pinpoint Implementation

Pinpoint serves as a valid point of comparison with the Monitor since both systems have the same
focused goal (diagnosis, as opposed to say performance debugging as in [28] with diagnosis being a
side issue) and have the same target application model (black-box or gray-box application and
passive observation of the application for diagnosis). Importantly, Pinpoint represents a recent stateof-the-art development ([29], [35]) and has been well explained and demonstrated on an open
source application (compare to Magpie [30] where the application is not available to us), and its
algorithms are not dependent on a huge set of parameters whose settings are left mysterious in the
publication (compare to the machine learning approach in [22][23] where several statistical
distributions would have to be assumed).
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We implement the Pinpoint algorithm (as explained in [29]) for comparison with our Monitor’s
diagnosis approach. Pinpoint diagnosis algorithm requires as input a dependency table—a mapping
of which components each transaction depends on. This is in contrast to the Monitor approach,
where such dependency information does not have to be determined a priori and fed into the system
before execution. Instead the Monitor deduces the dependencies through runtime observations as
described in Section II.B. For Pinpoint, when transactions are executed, their failure status is
determined by the failure detectors. A table (called the input matrix) is then created with the rows
being the transactions, the first column being the failure status, and the other columns being the
different components. If a cell T(i, 1) is 1, it indicates transaction i has failed. If a cell T(i, j) (j≠1) is
1, it indicates transaction i uses the component j. Pinpoint correlates the failures of transactions to
the components that are most likely to be the cause of the failure. The input matrix is fed as input to
a data clustering engine. The transpose of this binary input matrix is used by the data analysis
engine. The data analyzer computes the dissimilarity between the rows of transposed matrix, which
is represented by Jaccard`s distance. This matrix containing the distances between the components
is fed to a clustering algorithm called the Unweighted Pair Group Method with Arithmetic Mean
(UPGMA). The components that fall in the cluster having the failure row are diagnosed to be faulty.
A crucial point for the accurate operation of Pinpoint is that the transactions should be diverse
enough, i.e., use distinct non-overlapping components. Two transactions T1 and T2 are called
distinct with respect to a set of components {C1, C2, …, Ck} if there is no overlap between these
columns for T1 and T2, i.e., when T1’s row has a 1 in any of these columns, T2’s row has a zero, and
vice-versa. Pinpoint as described by the authors in [29] is an offline approach. For comparison with
the Monitor, we convert it into an online protocol. We incrementally feed the transactions and their
corresponding failure status as they occur in the application, rather than waiting for all the
transactions in a round to be completed before executing Pinpoint. To provide a comparable
platform between the Monitor and Pinpoint, we keep the testbed identical to that in [29]—same
client, web server, application server (with identical components), and database server. Since the
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performance of the Monitor and Pinpoint are sensitive to the transactions used, we would have liked
to use the same set of transactions as used by Pinpoint in [29]. However, the paper is silent on the
issue—it does not even provide the total number of transactions used. We contacted the authors of
Pinpoint but they were unable to provide us with the transactions either (see personal
communication in [42]).

D.

Detectors

We create the same detectors as in [29]. An internal and an external failure detector are built which
provide failure status of transactions to Pinpoint and the Monitor. The external detector detects
failures that will be visible to the user, such as application-specific failures, machine crashes or
complete service failures. We implemented this external detector as part of the client emulator. It
examines the output error log of lynx and flags a failure if an HTTP error is observed. Alternately,
if a transaction does not complete within 20 seconds, timeout occurs and the detector flags a failure.
An internal detector is used to detect a failure that may not imme diately manifest itself to users.
The internal detector is built to catch Java declared and undeclared exceptions in the application and
is embedded in each component.

E.

Fault Injection

We perform fault injection into the components of the PetStore application (i.e., Servlets and EJBs).
We choose a set of 9 components called target components consisting of six EJBs and three servlets
for fault injection. The names of the components are AddressEJB, AsyncSenderEJB, CatalogEJB,
CreditCardEJB, ContactInfoEJB, SupplierClientLocalFacadeEJB, enter_order_information.screen,
order.do, and item.screen. We use four different kinds of fault injection as in [29]:
−

Declared Exception: We inject IOException as the representative declared exception.

−

Undeclared Exception: This is a Runtime Exception not caught in the application.

−

Endless call: The target component has an infinite while loop.

−

Null call: Instead of returning the appropriate value, a method returns a null object.

18

The internal detector is more likely to detect the declared and the undeclared exceptions, and the
null calls while the external detector is more likely to detect the endless call. For a given round only
one target component is injected. We use 1-component, 2-component and 3-component triggers. In
a 1-component trigger, every time the target component is touched by a transaction, the fault in
injected in that component. In a 2-component trigger, a sequence of 2-components is determined
and whenever the sequence is touched during a transaction, the last component in the transaction is
injected. This mimics an interaction fault between two components, and, in the correct operation of
a diagnosis protocol, both components should be flagged as faulty. The 3-component fault is
defined similarly.

V. Results
A.

Performance Metrics

We use precision and accuracy as output metrics as in the Pinpoint work to enable a comparison. A
result is accurate when all components causing a fault are correctly identified. For example, if two
components, A and B, are interacting to cause a failure, identifying both would be accurate.
Identifying only one or neither would not be accurate. However, if the predicted fault set (by the
diagnosis algorithm) is {A, B, C, D, E} and the fault was in components {A, B}, then the accuracy
is still 100%. Precision captures the non-idealness in this case. Precision is the ratio of the number
of faulty components to the total number of entities in the predicted fault set. In the above example,
the precision is 40%. Components {C, D, E} are false positives. Lower precision implies high false
positives. There is a tension between accuracy and precision in most diagnosis algorithms. When
the algorithm is sensitive, it generates highly accurate results, but also causes a large number of
false alerts reducing precision. Pinpoint uses the UPGMA clustering algorithm and varying the size
of the faulty cluster varies the precision and accuracy. In the Monitor, after the diagnosis algorithm
terminates, an ordered list of components is produced in decreasing order of PPEP. We define the
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predicted fault set as the top k components in the ordered output list. We vary k to obtain different
accuracy and precision values.

B.

Single Component Faults

In single component faults, the fault injection trigger consists of a single component. If a transaction
touches the target component then one of the four kinds of faults (chosen randomly) is injected and
the injection remains permanent for the remainder of the round. First, let us consider the effect of
varying cluster size on the performance of Pinpoint. The total number of injections for these results
is 36—9 target components for injection and all 4 types of injection done on each component. The
averaged results for accuracy and precision are plotted in Figure 7 (the bars show 90% confidence
interval). As the size of the cluster increases, we see an increase in the accuracy which is intuitive
because at some point the failure cluster includes all the components that are actually faulty.
Beyond that, increase in cluster size does not impact the accuracy. As the cluster size increases, the
precision increases to a maximum value and then decreases thereafter. The increase occurs till all
the faulty components are included in the failure cluster. Thereafter, increasing the cluster size
includes other non-faulty components and thus brings down the precision. The maximum value of
precision occurs when all the faulty components are included in the failure cluster. However the
precision is still poor (less than 10%). This is explained by the observation that for the transactions
in the application, there is tight coupling between multiple components. Whenever the entire set of
tightly coupled components does not appear together as a fault trigger, which is the overwhelming
majority of the injections, the precision suffers. The amount of tight coupling between the
components is quantified through the experiment in Section F. We emphasize that if we were to
hand pick transactions such that they are distinguishable with respect to the target components, then
the performance of Pinpoint would improve. Two transactions Ti and Tj are indistinguishable with
respect to a set of components {C1, C2, … , Ck} if the columns of Ti in the input matrix
corresponding to these components are identical to that of Tj. Figure 7(a) shows the variation of
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Accuracy with False Positives for Pinpoint and the Monitor. This is averaged across the 36
injections for the presented results. For 1-component faults, Pinpoint has high false positives rates
but the accuracy eventually reaches 1. In contrast the Monitor has a much higher accuracy keeping
a low false positive rate. Monitor’s accuracy also reaches 1 but at a much lower value of false
positives (0.6) as compared to Pinpoint (> 0.9). The latency of detection in our system is very low.
Thus, the faulty component is often at the root of the Diagnosis Tree in the Monitor. Since error
propagation is thus minimized, the PPEP value for the faulty entity is high causing it to be
diagnosed by the Monitor. This explains the high accuracy for the Monitor. However, Pinpoint’s
algorithm does not take advantage of the temporal information—the temporal proximity between
the component where detection occurs and the component that is faulty. As a consequence its
accuracy suffers relative to that of the Monitor.
Notice that in Pinpoint, for a given value of false positives, two different accuracy values are
achieved since a given precision value is achieved for two different cluster sizes (Figure 7(b)).
Since accuracy is a monotonically increasing plot with cluster size (Figure 7(a)), the different
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Figure 7. 1-component fault injection: Variation of Accuracy and precision with cluster size in
Pinpoint.
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Figure 8. Single component fault injection: Performance of Pinpoint and Monitor. Both can
achieve high accuracy but Pinpoint suffers from high false positive rates.

C.

Two Component Faults

The 2-component fault injection results are shown in Figure 9. Pinpoint results improve in terms of
the false positives implying higher precision. This is attributed to the fact that Pinpoint’s clustering
method works better if the failing transactions are better distinguishable from the successful
transactions. Recollect distinguishable is discussed in the context of components. A 2-component
fault includes two components as the trigger and going from one component to two components
increases the distinguish-ability of transactions. Consider transaction T1 and T2 both of which use
component C1 (the trigger in a single component fault injection). However, for a two component
fault injection with trigger as {C1, C2}, the transactions T1 and T2 will be distinguishable as long as
both T1 and T2 do not use C2. Thus, say T1 uses {C1, C2} and T2 does not use C2. Then only T1 will
fail and T2 will not, leading to the diagnosis (considering simplistically that these are the only
transactions and components) of C1-C2 as the faulty entities.
In contrast, the Monitor results although, still significantly better than Pinpoint, suffer in the 2component fault injection. One can see that accuracy reaches a maximum of only 0.83 compared to
1.00 in 1-component injection. The number of times in a round the trigger for the 2-component fault
is hit is lower than for the single component fault. Each detection causes an execution of the
diagnosis process and each execution of the diagnosis process updates the parameters of the causal
graph away from an arbitrary initial setting toward an accurate set of values. Thus, for the 2component faults, the Monitor gets less opportunity for refining the parameter values and
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consequently the PPEP calculation is not as accurate as for the single component faults. This
explains the decline in performance of the Monitor for the 2-component faults.
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Figure 9. 2-component fault injection: Performance of Pinpoint and Monitor. Performance of
Monitor declines and Pinpoint improves from the single component fault, but Monitor still
outperforms Pinpoint.

Three Component Faults

D.

The 3-component fault injections show even better results for Pinpoint with the maximum average
precision value touching 27%. This is again attributed to the fact that more number of components
causes selected transactions to fail leading to a better performance by the clustering algorithm. The
Monitor again outperforms Pinpoint by achieving higher accuracy at much lower false positives.
The Monitor’s performance again declines compared to the 2-component faults due to the same
reason pointed in the previous section (the number of diagnoses for the 3-component trigger is less
than that for the 2-component trigger).
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Figure 10. 3-component fault injection: Performance of Pinpoint and Monitor. Performance
of Monitor declines and Pinpoint improves from the single and two component fault, but
Monitor still outperforms Pinpoint.
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Latency

E.

In its online incarnation, Pinpoint takes as input the transactions and corresponding failure status
every 30 seconds during a round. It runs the diagnosis for each of these snapshots taken at 30
second intervals, terminating when the round is complete and Pinpoint executes on the entire input
matrix corresponding to all the 55 transactions. Pinpoint’s performance only becomes reasonable at
3.5 minutes and above and hence we report only this part of the plot. Arguably this is a subjective
decision, but we find the meaningful insights are only possible when Pinpoint has data worth 3.5
minutes or more. The latency plots show that after 3.5 minutes the accuracy and precision increase
monotonically with latency.
We define the latency of diagnosis for the Monitor as the time delay from the receipt of the detector
alert which marks the beginning of the diagnosis till the PPEP ordered list is generated. The
Monitor has an average latency of 58.32 ms with a variance of 14.35 ms, aggregated across all three
fault injection campaigns.

0.4
1-Component
2-Component
3-Component

0.2

1-Component
2-Component
3-Component

0.3
Accuracy

Precision

0.3

0.1
0

0.2
0.1
0

3.5

4

4.5
5
5.5
Latency (minutes)

6

6.5

3.5

4

4.5
5
5.5
Latency (minutes)

6

6.5

Fig. 11(b)
Fig. 11(a)
Figure 11. Single component fault injection: Variation of accuracy and precision with latency
for Pinpoint. Higher latency means higher number of transaction data points and Pinpoint’s
performance improves monotonically.

F.

Behavior of Components

The PetStore application has some components which are tightly coupled, i.e., they tend to be
invoked together for the different transactions supported by the application. We have noted earlier
that tight coupling negatively impacts Pinpoint’s clustering algorithm. For our experiments, we
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inject failures in 9 components and here we consider how tightly coupled these components are
with the other components in PetStore. AddressEJB is tightly coupled with 4 components implying
that it always occurs with these 4 components in all the 55 transactions in our experimental setup.
Pinpoint cannot distinguish between sets of components that are tightly coupled and thus reports all
the tightly coupled components as faulty even though in reality only a subset of these may be faulty.
This is the fundamental reason why its precision is found to be low in all our experiments. To
counter this problem, one can synthetically create transactions that independently use different
components (as noted by the authors themselves in [29]). However, for an application like PetStore,
components are naturally tightly coupled and thus generating such synthetic transactions is a
difficult task. Also even if we could devise such “unnatural” transactions that would make
components distinguishable, it cannot be assumed that such transactions will be created by regular
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Figure 12. Tightly connected components

VI. Related Work
White box systems: The problem of diagnosis in distributed systems can be classified according to
the nature of the application system being monitored – white box where the system is observable
and, optionally, controllable; and black box where the system is neither. The Monitor system falls in
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the latter class. White box diagnostic systems often use event correlation where every managed
device is instrumented to emit an alarm when its state changes [8][18]-[20]. By correlating the
received alarms, a centralized manager is able to diagnose the problem. Obviously, this depends on
access to the internals of the application components. Also it raises the concern whether a failing
component’s embedded detector can generate the alert. This model does not fit our problem
description since the target system for the Monitor comprises of COTS components, which have to
be treated as black-box. A number of white box diagnosis systems that correlate alarms have been
proposed in the intrusion detection area [43][44]. An alternative diagnostic approach is to use endto-end probing [21]-[23]. A probe is a test transaction whose outcome depends on some of the
system’s components; diagnosis is performed by appropriately selecting the probes and analyzing
the results. Probe selection is typically an offline, inexact, and computationally heavy process.
Probing is an intrusive mechanism because it stresses the system with new requests. Also it is not
guaranteed that the state of the system with respect to the failure being diagnosed has stayed
constant till the time of the probe.
Multiprocessor system diagnosis: The traditional field of diagnosis has developed around the
target of multiprocessor systems, first addressed in a seminal paper by Preparata et al. [11] known
as the PMC method. The PMC approach, along with several other deterministic models [7],
assumed tests to be perfect and mandated that each entity be tested a fixed number of times.
Probabilistic diagnosis, on the other hand, can only diagnose faulty nodes with a high probability
but can relax assumptions about the nature of the fault (intermittent faulty nodes can be diagnosed)
and the structure of the testing graph [14], [15]. Follow up work focused on multiple syndrome
testing [13] where multiple syndromes were generated for the same node proceeding in multiple
lock steps. Both use the comparison based testing approach whereby a test workload is executed by
multiple nodes and a difference indicates suspicion of failure. The authors in [24] propose a fully
distributed algorithm that allows every fault-free node to achieve diagnosis in, at most, (log N)2
testing rounds. More recently, in [25] the authors extend traditional multiprocessor diagnosis to
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handle change of failure state during the diagnostic process. All of these approaches are
fundamentally different from ours since there is no separation between the payload and the monitor
system. This implies the application system has to be observable as well as controllable (to generate
the tests and analyze them).
Embedded system diagnosis: There has also been considerable work in the area of diagnosis of
embedded systems, particularly in automotive electronic systems as in [26] (detection and shut
down of faulty actuators in automotive systems) and [27] (use assertions to correlate anomalies
from multiple components). The papers in this domain do not consider imperfect observability of
the sensor input or the actuator output, possibly because of tight coupling between the payload and
the monitor systems. They are focused on scheduling monitor processes under tight computational
resource constraints while we do not have such constraints.
Debugging in distributed applications: There has been a spurt of work in providing tools for
debugging

problems

in

distributed

applications

–

performance

problems

[28]-[30],

misconfigurations [31], unexpected behavior [31], etc. The general flavor of the approaches in this
domain is that the tool collects trace information at different levels of granularity (line of code to
process) and the collected traces are automatically analyzed, often offline, to determine the possible
root causes of the problem. For example, in [28], the debugging system performs analysis of
message traces to determine the causes of long latencies. The goal of these efforts is to deduce
dependencies in distributed applications and flag possible root causes to aid the programmer in the
manual debug process, and not to produce automated diagnosis. Moreover tools like Pip [45],
debug distributed applications by comparing the actual behaviour to the expected behaviour of an
application. They give an expectation language that allows the programmer to express in a
declarative language the expections about the system. Also they provide tools for gathering events,
checking behavior and visualizing valid and invalid behaviors which aid in tracking the bugs.
More recent work has produced powerful tools for debugging of distributed applications. In [45],
the authors present a tool called liblog that aids in recreating the events that occurred prior to and
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during failure. The replay can be done offline at a different site. The tool guarantees that the event
state in its log will be consistent, i.e., no message is received before it has been sent. This work
stops short of automated diagnosis. Some other mechanism, not described in the paper, is
responsible for taking the replayed events and determining the root cause. There are several other
offline tools that aid diagnosis, such as tools for data slicing [46], backtracking [47], and
deterministic replay [48][49], but they all require manual effort in diagnosing the faulty components.
Online tools focus on data collection [48][50][51] rather than on automated diagnosis. A recent
work [52] performs online failure diagnosis through a novel concept. When a failure occurs, some
failure triggering events are captured right then. The system can roll back to a checkpoint in case of
failure and when re-executing, heavy duty instrumentation is applied. Inspired by manual
debugging, the Triage Diagnosis Protocol (TDP) provides a top-down failure-guided diagnosis.
Based on the failure symptom and previous diagnosis results, TDP automatically decides the next
step of instrumentation or analysis. The initial diagnosis happens at the user site, preserving the
privacy of any user data, and then the detailed diagnosis happens at the programmer's site. This
work relies on perfect checkpointing and the assumption that the state will not change between the
original failing execution and the re-execution. It also assumes the application is white-box and can
be instrumented. The work has to deal with the challenge of the user not trusting the debugging
system completely. This problem is assumed away in our workthe Monitor can observe any
interaction between the application components.
Network diagnosis: Diagnosis in IP networks is adderessed in Shrink [54]. This tool used for root
cause analysis of network faults models the diagnosis problem as a Bayesian network. It
specifically diagnoses inaccurate mappings between IP and optical layers. The work in [55] studies

the effectiveness and practicality of Tree-Augmented Naive Bayesian Networks (or TANs) as a
basis for performing offline diagnosis and forecasting from system-level instrumentation in a threetier network service. The TAN models are studied to select combinations of metrics and thresholds
values that correlate with performance states of the systems (compliance with Service Level
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Objectves).

This approach differs from the Monitor approach in the sense that it relies on

monitoring performance metrics rather than diagnosing the origin of the problem over a set of
possible components.
Automated diagnosis in COTS systems: Automated diagnosis for black-box distributed COTS
components is addressed in [32], [33]. The system model has replicated COTS application
components, whose outputs are voted on and the replicas which differ from the majority are
considered suspect. This work takes the restricted view that all application components are
replicated and failures manifest as divergences from the majority. In [17], the authors present a
combined model for automated detection, diagnosis, and recovery with the goal of automating the
recovery process. However, the failures are all fail-silent and no error propagation happens in the
system, the results of any test can be instantaneously observed, and the monitor accuracy is
predictable.
In none of the existing work that we are aware of is there a rigorous treatment of the impact of the
Monitor’s constraints and limited observability on the accuracy of the diagnosis process. There are
sometimes statements made on this without supporting reasoning – for example, in [28], it is
mentioned that drop rates up to 5% do not affect accuracy of the diagnosis.

VII. Conclusion
In this paper we presented an online diagnosis system called the Monitor for arbitrary failures in
distributed applications. The Monitor passively observes the message exchanges between the
components of the application and at runtime, performs a probabilistic diagnosis of the component
that was the root cause of a detected failure The Monitor is compared to the state-of –the-art
diagnosis framework called Pinpoint.
We tested the two systems on a 3-tier Java-based e-commerce system called PetStore. Extensive
fault injection experiments were performed to evaluate the accuracy and precision of the two
schemes. The Monitor outperformed Pinpoint particularly in precision, though its advantage
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narrowed for interaction faults. As part of future work we are looking at diagnosis in high
throughput network streams. In these streams, the Monitor may have to decide to drop some parts
of a stream. We are looking into intelligent decision making to maintain a high accuracy. We are
also investigating machine learning based diagnosis in the presence of uncertain information.
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